





REVA B.  SIEGEL 
Equality’s Frontiers: How Congress’s Section 5 Power 
Can Secure Transformative Equality (as Justice 
Ginsburg Illustrates in Coleman) 
This Essay was adapted from remarks delivered at Equality’s Frontiers, a panel 
discussion celebrating Justice Ginsburg’s gender-equality jurisprudence and analyzing 
its relationship with new developments in the law of equality. The discussion preceded 
Justice Ginsburg’s Gruber Distinguished Lecture in Women’s Rights, held on October 
19, 2012, at Yale University. 
 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s work continues to illuminate equality’s 
frontiers, as today’s intergenerational conversation among friends and 
colleagues so richly testifies. To illustrate the generativity of her work, it is of 
course tempting to focus on cases for which Justice Ginsburg is famous. But in 
these remarks, I would like to draw attention to a recent decision unfamiliar to 
most, Coleman v. Court of Appeals,1 in which Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, 
addresses Congress’s role in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment and shows 
how actors outside courts can help vindicate constitutional rights and 
implement equality in transformative ways. In Coleman, Justice Ginsburg 
reconstructs several decades of history to illustrate how debate in civil society 
and in Congress can build consensus to enforce equal protection guarantees, 
and ultimately move Congress to commit resources to new means of securing 
the equal protection of the laws. Justice Ginsburg’s Coleman dissent shows how 
the Court and Congress acting together can enforce the Constitution’s promise 
of equal citizenship in ways the Court acting alone cannot. 
Coleman concerns popular legislation, the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA).2 The FMLA is a federal law, enacted in 1993, that entitles employees 
 
1.  132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
2.  29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). 
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to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year for family care (for the care 
of the employee’s newborn child,3 for the placement of a child with the 
employee for adoption or foster care,4 or for the care of the employee’s spouse, 
son, daughter, or parent with a serious medical condition5) and for self-care (to 
care for the employee’s own serious health condition when the condition 
interferes with the employee’s ability to perform at the workplace).6 The Act 
covers public and private employers and enables employees to bring suit to 
secure enforcement of the Act’s family-care and self-care provisions.7 
But the precise legal question at issue in Coleman was not one about which 
there is or is likely to be widespread public interest. The question presented in 
Coleman was whether Congress had power to subject state governments to 
suits under the FMLA for money damages for breach of the Act’s self-care 
provision. States are ordinarily immune to suits for money damages unless 
they consent to suit and waive their immunity.8 But when Congress exercises 
its power to enforce constitutional rights—for example, under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to enact legislation 
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause—then Congress can authorize suits for 
money damages against state governments.9 So the technical legal question at 
issue in Coleman was whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave 
Congress power to enact the self-care provision of the FMLA. 
By now, you, too, might be asking the question that puzzled the Court: 
why did Congress claim that legislation giving employees the right to sick leave 
was a way of enforcing the equal protection of the laws? 
The Court had upheld the FMLA’s family-care provisions as a valid exercise 
of Congress’s Section 5 power in the 2003 case of Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs,10 where the Court found that the legislation remedied and 
deterred sex discrimination in the provision of leave benefits. In Coleman, 
however, the Court refused to find that the FMLA’s self-care provisions were a 
valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power. “Without widespread evidence of 
sex discrimination or sex stereotyping in the administration of sick leave, it is 
 
3.  Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A). 
4.  Id. § 2612(a)(1)(B). 
5.  Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
6.  Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 
7.  Id. § 2617 (a)(2). 
8.  See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-79 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
711-12 (1999). 
9.  See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
10.  538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
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apparent that the congressional purpose in enacting the self-care provision is 
unrelated to these supposed wrongs,”11 Justice Kennedy reasoned, in an 
opinion that at times verged on dismissive and that never once addressed 
arguments raised in Justice Ginsburg’s twenty-page dissent. “There is nothing 
in particular about self-care leave . . . that connects it to gender 
discrimination,” he continued.12 “States may not be subject to suits for 
damages based on violations of a comprehensive statute unless Congress has 
identified a specific pattern of constitutional violations by state employers.”13 
The five Justices denying Congress Section 5 power to enforce the FMLA’s 
self-care provisions through suits for money damages were more concerned 
about protecting the sovereign immunity of states and the sole authority of the 
Court to interpret the Equal Protection Clause than they were interested in 
understanding Congress’s reasons for adopting innovative approaches to 
enforcing the equal protection guarantee. 
Justice Ginsburg, by contrast, approached the question from a very 
different perspective. In a dissent joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, Justice Ginsburg applied the governing Boerne14 framework that defines 
Congress’s Section 5 powers,15 yet did so differently from Justice Kennedy. 
Justice Ginsburg was interested in understanding the reasons that led Congress 
to bundle family-care and self-care leave in the FMLA, and she respectfully 
discussed the concerns of the social-movement actors who taught Congress to 
care about enforcing the equal protection of the laws in this way.16 Her dissent 
lives at equality’s frontiers because Justice Ginsburg is attuned to the interplay 
among social movements, democratic bodies, and courts from which new 
approaches to enforcing equality emerge. 
Justice Ginsburg has long lived at equality’s frontiers. After all, the author 
of the Coleman dissent began her career as a litigator for the women’s 
movement, teaching the Court and the nation new ways to understand their 
Constitution’s commitment to guarantee all persons the “equal protection of 
the laws.” While she and the movement for which she litigated succeeded 
beyond the wildest imagining of any, they did not wholly prevail. Forty years 
ago, they sought ratification of an Equal Rights Amendment, and, with it, 
 
11.  Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1335 (2012). 
12.  Id. at 1337. 
13.  Id. 
14.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
15.  Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339, 1342, 1345 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (applying the three-part 
Boerne test for Section 5 legislation). 
16.  Id. at 1340-42. 
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equality in the conditions in which women conceived and raised children—
rights to sex equality in the workplace, to contraception, to abortion, and to 
publicly supported childcare.17 We can hear these movement themes in the way 
then-Professor Ginsburg reasoned about the Court’s sex-equality docket in 
1978: 
Not only the sex discrimination cases, but the cases on contraception, 
abortion, and illegitimacy as well, present various faces of a single 
issue: the roles women are to play in society. Are women to have the 
opportunity to participate in full partnership with men in the nation’s 
social, political, and economic life? This is a constitutional issue, . . . 
surely one of the most important in this final quarter of the twentieth 
century.18 
Because the author of the Coleman dissent understands equality as a 
question of social life—involving “the roles women are to play in society”—she 
understands equality as including not only the right to be free from 
discrimination, but also the rights to make decisions about contraception and 
abortion.19 There is more. If sex equality concerns “the roles women are to play 
in society,” it concerns the organization of our basic institutions, and so will 
implicate questions of social structure and distributive justice—both positive 
rights as well as negative rights—that may be beyond the sole competence of 
courts to vindicate. 
Justice Ginsburg and the other dissenting Justices in Coleman reason from 
the expectation that equality is transformative: that it arises from and changes 
our constitutive social norms and arrangements. Given these ties between 
equality and social life, equality requires Congress as well as the courts for its 
vindication. 
 
17.  For the movement’s claims, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism 
and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1943, 1984-2004 (2003); and Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement 
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto Era, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1366-
1414 (2006). 
18.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 4 WOMEN’S RTS. 
L. REP. 143, 143-44 (1978) (footnote omitted) (citing Kenneth L. Karst, Book Review, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1036 (1976) (reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975))). 
19.  For arguments concerning reproductive choice that Ruth Bader Ginsburg advanced during 
this same period, see Reva B. Siegel, Equality and Choice: Sex Equality Perspectives on 
Reproductive Rights in the Work of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 63 (2013). 
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In Coleman, the dissenting Justices approach the FMLA record with an 
assumption that Congress has an important role to play in enforcing 
constitutional guarantees; they assume that Congress and the courts acting 
together can enforce equality values in ways a court acting alone could not. 
This presumption guides their orientation to the record. Where the Justices 
who would deny Congress Section 5 power can see no connection between self-
care leave and constitutional equality values, the dissenters recognize in 
Congress’s decision to bundle family-care and self-care leave a commitment to 
provide employees family leave in a form that would not exacerbate employers’ 
tendency to discriminate against young women of childbearing age in hiring 
and promotion. Congress decided it could promote work-family balance 
without triggering discrimination by coupling a form of leave employers would 
expect women to take (family leave) with a form of leave employers would 
expect employees of both sexes to take (sick leave). The statutory design is 
Congress’s, but, as you read Justice Ginsburg’s account, you can appreciate 
that Congress is guided throughout by the hard-won experience of the 
women’s movement. 
The Congress that enacted the FMLA appreciated that the discrimination 
women face in the workplace arises from role conflicts, both ascribed and 
actual. Ascribed: In this society, we view female employees as having primary 
responsibility for family care. Actual: In this society, we organize work and 
family relations so that caregivers are at a real disadvantage in the workplace. 
These two forms of role conflict create an advocates’ dilemma. Prohibiting 
discrimination cannot resolve work-family conflicts. But if advocates seek 
family-leave protections for pregnant women and for those engaged in 
caregiving work, they increase the chance of the identification of any young 
woman as a prospective caregiver and raise the potential cost of hiring women. 
In short, the effort to promote equality may exacerbate employers’ tendency to 
stereotype new mothers and mothers-to-be and so create disincentives to 
hiring all young women. 
The solution animating the design of the FMLA, as Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent explained: seek universal rather than targeted leave benefits designed to 
raise the baseline for all employees, rather than singling out women and 
caregivers for accommodation. The hope: providing gender-neutral family 
leave and self-care leave to men and women would make all employees 
prospective leave-takers, rather than singling out women as suspect or 
expensive hires.20 At the same time, universalizing leave benefits would make it 
possible for women to take leave and to retain jobs during pregnancy and early 
 
20.  See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1347-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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child care, while opening the door to the prospect of men, too, taking 
employment leave for family care.21 
As Justice Ginsburg described, the Act’s gender-neutral self-care and 
family-leave provisions worked together: 
Essential to its design, Congress assiduously avoided a legislative 
package that, overall, was or would be seen as geared to women only. 
Congress thereby reduced employers’ incentives to prefer men over 
women, advanced women’s economic opportunities, and laid the 
foundation for a more egalitarian relationship at home and at work. 
The self-care provision is a key part of that endeavor, and, in my view, a 
valid exercise of congressional power under §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.22 
The Coleman dissenters view Congress as essential in enforcing equality—if 
equality is to be transformative—because of the very characteristics that 
distinguish Congress from the Court. Given its democratic and deliberative 
structure, Congress can debate for decades what equality in work and family 
requires; Congress can address distributive questions raised by claims for 
structural change; and Congress can gather testimony about interventions that 
are, in practice, likely to succeed given changing sex-role expectations of 
Americans “at home and at work.” For these reasons, in enacting the FMLA’s 
self-care provisions, Congress was able to enforce the Court’s understanding of 
equal protection (nondiscrimination in employment) by means that no court 
could command.23 Justice Ginsburg’s Coleman dissent appreciates that 
Congress, enforcing its constitutionally endowed Section 5 powers, can secure 
for men and women “the equal protection of the laws” in ways that a court 
acting alone, by its very institutional structure, cannot. 
 
21.  Without a doubt, the universal-benefits approach raised the price on the leave package of 
the FMLA, but Congress negotiated with all players and adopted a compromise framework 
(exempting smaller employers and restricting leave benefits) that integrated commitments 
to equality, family, and efficiency. For a brief history of the FMLA as a sex equality statute 
that negotiated these practical problems, see Post & Siegel, supra note 17, at 2014-20. 
22.  Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1350 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
23.  Justice Ginsburg thus sets forth the case for Congress’s exercise of its Section 5 power under 
the Boerne framework. Self-care leave is a congruent and proportional means of deterring 
acts of sex discrimination by public employers that would violate the Constitution as the 
Court has interpreted it. See id. at 1347-50. 
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It is a rich—or revealing—irony of Coleman that the very Justices hostile to 
affirmative action in the Fisher arguments24 were also hostile to the equality 
legislation in Coleman. That is, the same block of conservative Justices who 
harshly questioned the University of Texas about its reasons for consciously 
considering race in admissions also disdained Congress’s reasons for enforcing 
FMLA gender-neutral self-care leave under Section 5—even though, as Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent painstakingly shows, Congress was committed to 
universalizing, rather than targeting, benefits in the design of the Act. 
What this comparison teaches, in conclusion, is that targeting and 
universalism are strategies that each can be employed in equality’s pursuit. In 
context, targeting and universalism each can be transformative.25 In her 
Coleman dissent, Justice Ginsburg shows reasons why, in the FMLA context, 
Congress concluded that distribution of leave in universal rather than in 
targeted form was crucial to deterring sex discrimination in hiring and 
promotion. 
A judicially enforced prohibition on sex discrimination is essential to 
opening opportunities at work, but, as Congress found, its effects will be 
limited by entrenched sex-role assumptions and the prevailing organization of 
family and market work. Long-running public debate was required to identify 
the problem in enforcing sex-equality principles in the workplace, to devise 
creative ways of combatting it, and to forge the commitment to do so. Justice 
Ginsburg’s Coleman dissent demonstrates how dialogue among social 
movements, Congress, and the courts is crucial to realizing constitutional 
ideals, at equality’s frontiers. 
 
*                 *                * 
 
Justice Ginsburg offered the following response: 
Thank you, Reva, for that excellent presentation. You said so much 
in admirably concise form. Coleman was another dissent I summarized 
from the bench—not to castigate my colleagues, but as an exercise in 
damage control. I, of course, believe that the view I embraced was the 
one Congress intended when it enacted the Family and Medical Leave 
Act. But my pitch was this: the current Court is protective of state 
 
24.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-58, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. 
argued Oct. 10, 2012). 
25.  See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision 
in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1357-58 (2011) (discussing when it may be effective 
to employ universalist regulatory forms in pursuit of equality). 
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sovereign immunity, and all this decision holds is that you can’t get 
damages from the state if it denies you self-care leave. You can get 
injunctive relief so the state won’t do it in the future, and, further, the 
FMLA is in full force in the private sector. So, Reva, I didn’t read the 
majority as rejecting my universalist view of how to respond to 
discrimination. I emphasized that leave for self-care remains the 
obligation of the private sector, even state governments, except they 
don’t have to pay money out of pocket when they fail to comply with 
the law. 
 
*                 *                * 
 
Reva B. Siegel is the Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law at Yale 
University. It was an honor for the author to share the day’s conversation with Justice 
Ginsburg and an intergenerational circle of friends, exploring horizons opened by 
Justice Ginsburg’s work. 
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